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The meeting was held at Marquette University, March 6-9, 1997. The 
topic was "The Later Jena Wissenschaftslehre." The meeting opened 
with a 'Fichtean Sampler,' loosely focused on the Wissenschaftslehre 
Nova Methodo lectures 0796-99). Tom Rockmore offered an account of 
'deduction' in Fichte's philosophy, noting that Fichte holds two 
incompatible views—a Kantian one that promises logical deduction and 
a weaker sense that promises only rigorous exposition of the fact of 
knowledge. If our interest is philosophical, not merely historical, the 
Kantian version is best forgotten since it puts Fichte in the unhappy 
position of having to make good the claims of epistemological 
foundationalism. A weaker but more palatable take on the 
Wissenschaftslehre is as a rigorous attempt to view human knowledge 
from the limited standpoint of the human subject. Angelica Nuzzo 
located the defining characteristic of the Wissenschaftslehre Nova 
Methodo in its abolition of the distinction, inherited from Kant, 
between the practical and the theoretical. The 1794 Grundlage des 
gesamten Wissenschaftslehre had already transmuted the distinction 
of practical and theoretical faculties or powers into that of real and 
ideal activities. The Nova Methodo lectures fashion a unified view of 
the activities of the 'I' and spell out a new vision of philosophic 
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system, beyond the dualism of theory and practice. Kip Jensen came 
to much the same conclusion: the textbook version of Fichte's 
philosophy as an overblown version of Kant's 'primacy of the practical' 
is not to be found in the later Jena Wissenschaftslehre. What is found 
is a unitary philosophy based on the ‘I’ reflecting itself outside the 
limits of reflection. Jensen characterized the project as a drive to 
comprehend the incomprehensible, to cognize the very origin of 
reflexivity or consciousness. Jay Morris focused on freedom and self-
activity in the later Jena lectures, arguing that Fichte saw difficulties in 
Kant's treatment of these two themes. If Kant left Critical Philosophy 
without a unified account of reason, Fichte made good the lack by 
identifying Spontaneität and Selbsttatigkeit. Fichte thus improves 
Kant's philosophy by being faithful to its spirit, not its letter. Hans-
Jakob Wilhelm considered the overstated claim Fichte made to Jacobi 
that he could deduce the individual from the absolute ‘I’. Whereas 
Jacobi resorted to the philosophical novel to bridge the gap between 
theoretical construct and the living individual, in Fichte's system the 
individual person remains an irrational quantity that can be treated 
only by pragmatic means, through a politics of education. Wayne 
Martin closed this 'sampler' session by considering Fichte's relation to 
philosophy of science. One ought not simply assimilate Fichte's interest 
in particular sciences either to what Lauth calls Fichte's 
"transcendental doctrine of nature" nor to the project of 
Naturphilosophie. The 1794 essay "On the Concept of 
Wissenschaftslehre" provides an approach useful for formulating a 
distinctively Fichtean philosophy of science, since it treats the 
particular sciences not so much as bodies of theory but as distinctive 
cognitive practices organized around unifying theoretical principles. 
 
The second and third sessions of the conference were devoted 
to influences upon Fichte and his reception by other philosophers. 
Daniel Breazeale offered an experimental 'fictionalist' reading of the 
Wissenschaftslehre as the first of a two-part attempt to avoid the 
standard interpretation that treats it as a piece of metaphysical 
dogmatism. Despite the attractiveness of such an "as-if" reading, it 
ignores important features of Fichte's project, e.g. its attempt to 
reflect real human thinking in systematic form. Claude Piche discussed 
Fichte's doctrine of feeling against the background of Jacobi's critique 
of Kant. Fichte agrees with Jacobi that neither a phenomenal object 
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nor an object in itself can explain the origin of affection. Like Jacobi, 
he concludes that if no 'object' of any sort can provide the explanation, 
it must be sought in the knowing subject. For this reason, the 
Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo reinterprets sense-perception as 
'feeling,' contrary to Kant's definition of the term. But in the end, the 
origin of 'feelings' remains as much a mystery as Kant's thing-in-itself. 
Bruce Merrill considered the Kantian origins of Fichte's thought. The 
"First Introduction" to the Wissenschaftslehre appropriates Kant's Third 
Antinomy (the conflict between freedom and determinism) and its 
resolution in a shift from theory to practice. It also reflects the Second 
Critique's 'proof' of freedom as a "fact of reason"—the site where 
Fichte first attached himself to Kantian philosophy in 1790. Curtis 
Bowman closed the second session by exploring the Kantian 
background to the Atheism Controversy of 1799 and Jacobi's charge 
that the Wissenschaftslehre was nihilistic. It was Kant's moral 
theology, reflected in the Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, that 
moved Fichte to identify God and the moral world-order in the later 
Jena period. For Jacobi, this identification was too close to the position 
he had repudiated in the conflict over pantheism in the 1780's. Steve 
Hoeltzel opened the third session with a consideration of the 
divergences between Fichte and Schelling 1794-1797. While Fichte 
characterizes the system-principle or "absolute I" as free but 
intrinsically finite activity, Schelling insists that the absolute's freedom 
is incompatible with any limitation. Consequently, he claims philosophy 
is unable to link the finite world of human experience to its 
unconditioned basis—a position quite opposed to Fichte's. Dale Snow 
looked to later differences between the two thinkers as they emerged 
in the earnest but often bitter Correspondence (1799-1803). Fichte 
criticizes Schelling's unfortunate tendency to give a false metaphysical 
status to the real, while Schelling in turn laments Fichte's inability to 
escape the subjective and achieve true speculative insight. George 
Seidel connected Fichte with the tradition of innate ideas that runs 
through modern philosophy from Descartes to Leibniz. He argued that 
in Kant and Fichte, the idea takes on practical significance, signifying 
the "moral law written in the human heart" (Romans 2: 15). Vladimir 
Zeman discussed Feuerbach's relationship to Fichte. What in 
Feuerbach's pre-1839 idealistic period tended to be a positive 
assessment becomes in his mature philosophy primarily a negative 
critique. Michael Vater compared Fichte's phenomenalism with that of 
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the 2nd Century Indian Buddhist, Nagarjuna. Though both thinkers 
hold comparable positions on the nature of the ‘I’, the reactive 
structure of perception and consciousness, and on the primitive nature 
of agency, the phenomenal world that Fichte presents as the horizon 
of actualized freedom is viewed by the Buddhist thinker as duhkha, the 
torrent of craving and dissatisfaction from which one seeks liberation. 
Lon Nease treated the "severity of the moral law" in Fichte as yet 
another example of Fichte's drawing the full consequences of a Kantian 
theory more consistently and more rigorously than Kant himself did. 
For Fichte no acts are morally neutral. 
 
The fourth session was devoted to Fichte's ethics. Yolanda Estes 
considered the relation between pure will and intellectual intuition in 
the later Jena period. The moral situation of an empirical individual 
faced by a summons (Aufforderung) provides the material from which 
the philosopher abstracts the concept of intellectual intuition or pure 
willing that grounds the Wissenschaftslehre. This pure will has different 
functions in different parts of the system. In transcendental philosophy 
it serves as a scientific hypothesis for the construction of a theory of 
consciousness. As a hypothetical imperative facing a determined 
empirical individual, it becomes a hypothesis for theory of law 
(Rechtslehre). Intuited by the moral subject, it is the categorical 
imperative, the basis for moral theory (Sittenlehre). Alain Perrinjaquet 
focused on a similar theme, the way conscience functions as 'real' 
intellectual intuition in the Nova Methodo lectures. He illustrated the 
connection of conscience to intellectual intuition qua Tathandlung, and 
the relationship of both forms of intellectual intuition to the 
philosopher's consciousness. Arnold Farr considered Fichte's 
reformulation of Kant's categorical imperative in the later Jena 
writings. Kant's view of the imperative as merely the announcement of 
moral duty is inadequate since it does not provide for the unity of 
theoretical and practical reason. In Fichte's view, not only does the 'I' 
become conscious of its duty through the imperative, it also becomes 
conscious of the conditions for acting dutifully it becomes conscious of 
the limitations against which it must strive. The 'I' finds itself 
simultaneously active and passive, and this points to the 
equiprimordiality of the theoretical reason (the feeling of necessity) 
and its practical aspect (the feeling of freedom). Ken Foldes considered 
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the notion of freedom found in Fichte's Orundlage des Naturrechts and 
elaborated Hegel's early critique of this concept. 
 
A fifth session was devoted to the Wissenschaftslehre Nova 
Methodo and comparisons to earlier and later works that expounded 
the Wissenschaftslehre. C. Jeffrey Kinlaw explored the relation 
between feeling (Gefühl) and drive or disposition (Trieb) in Fichte's 
theory of knowledge. Since knowing an object requires that feeling be 
brought to consciousness, and such knowing is guided by drives—e.g. 
the drive to represent or, more basically, the drive to reflect—this 
epistemological function sheds new light on the primacy of practical 
reason in Fichte's philosophy. Perhaps that primacy may be more 
radical than has usually been acknowledged. Janet Roccanova explored 
the early chapters of the Nova Methodo lectures, using 
phenomenological concepts such as 'the given' and 'intentionality' to 
illustrate how Fichte guides his students through the performance of 
the series of acts that are under discussion. Fichte believes that one 
who wishes to become a philosopher must actually perform the 
philosophy, especially the crucial initial acts of Wissenschaftslehre that 
make the transition between ordinary and philosophical consciousness. 
In these acts are developed the germs of Fichte's notions of self-
positing, intellectual intuition, the concept of the 'I,' reason, and the 
opposition between concept and intuition. Gunter Zoller discussed the 
status of the individual in a wide range of writings from the later Jena 
Wissenschaftslehre, stressing the systematic place of individuality 
between the absolute 'I' on the one hand and the inter personality of 
the social and moral spheres on the other. He noted, as had Estes and 
Perrinjaquet, the different status accorded to individuality in the 
foundational part of the system, the transcendental history of 
consciousness, and in the Foundation of Natural Law (1796-97) and 
the System of Ethics (1798). Johannes Brachtendorf examined the 
methodological differences between the 1794/95 Grundlage and the 
Nova Methodo lectures of 1796-99. The earlier work invoked the 
notion of an apparently external' check' to account for the determinacy 
of the'!, encountered in representation. While this did account for 
externality, it fell short of Fichte's own concept of a theory of principles 
that fulfill the requirements of a homogeneous, idealist philosophy. 
The second Jena Wissenschaftslehre fulfills that requirement, since its 
whole account of the construction of consciousness is based on the 
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idea of a free and spontaneous act of self-determination by the 'l.' rves 
Radrizzani argued that the Vocation of Man does not represent a break 
with earlier Jena writings, but is fully consistent with them. 
 
The final session was devoted to the topic of intersubjectivity 
and the Grundlage des Naturrechts. Speaking directly to that topic, 
Klaus Brinkmann emphasized the originality of Fichte as the first to 
argue that personal identity is socially constructed. But he noted also 
that the community remains a community of individuals; Fichte is not 
a totalitarian. Robert Williams considered the ambiguity of Fichte's 
philosophy of right. Fichte introduces the concept of recognition (An 
erkennung) to provide a grounding both for Kant's sense of freedom 
and for Rousseau's social contract. Freedom and right as the existence 
of freedom in the world are intersubjectively mediated through 
recognition. But Fichte fails to fully ground his concept of right in 
recognition and allows it to be displaced by coercion in his analysis of 
security, changing community from a condition of freedom to an 
instrument of surveillance. Hegel is aware of this tension in Fichte and 
responds by consistently developing the idea of right from the concept 
of recognition. Jean-Christoph Merle located Fichte's Rechtslehre in the 
contemporary {late 18th Century} debates about natural law in 
opposition to positive law, the criminal code. Fichte's theory of criminal 
law "out-Kant's Kant." Scott Scribner noted that the idea of subtle 
matter that Fichte uses in the 1813 Notebook on Animal Magnetism 
(where it signifies the medium for hypnotic communication) dates back 
to the 1796 Grundlage des Naturrechts. The problem of the influence 
of the other, overtly captured in the concept of recognition, is 
paralleled in this work by a generalized problem of 'influence,' 
represented by the notion of subtle matter. Fichte moves toward 
according to the unconscious an important role in social life, even at 
this early date. Paul Franks argued that the new method of the later 
Jena Wissenschaftslehre signifies a transformation in Fichte's thinking 
that dates back to the summer of 1795, to his first inklings that the 
problem of other minds and the problem of human rights might have 
the same solution. In the systematically worked 232 The Owl of 
Minerva 28:2 (Spring 1997) out version of the unified solution, it is the 
summons (Aufforderung) that testifies to the reality of other minds 
and provides the unified treatment of theory and practice. But the 
reason why Fichte may have come to the thought of the unified 
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solution to human rights and other minds may have been a conviction, 
formed in debate with Schmid and Reinhold in 1795, that in this way 
heteronomy could be acknowledged as a mode of human freedom. 
Whether this was Fichte's actual path of thought or not, it is a 
philosophically interesting point of intersection between 
epistemological concerns about the status of other minds and concerns 
about normativity in practical philosophy. 
